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BY VICTOR S. YARROS.
IT will not clo for philosophers and seers to gallop away from the
position assumed by the average body of human beings in a
community. If the plain men and women, the majority of a given
society, are left far behind on the road to the Ideal, what happens is
that the Ideal remains a paper scheme, a pleasant dream, while the
plain, matter-of-fact people who live and work and play in the
world as it is know not of the Ideal, or, if they hear of it from
authors and preachers whom they can understand, treat it as some-
thing so remote and Utopian as to have no bearing whatever on
actual conduct.
Sociologists and moralists are beginning to appreciate this
sobering truth. They are beginning to reckon seriously with the
plain man, to put him into their equations, to test their doctrines and
proposals by asking whether they fit his mind and character. Ours
is a Pragmatic and Behaviorist age, though many of us are not
ready to accept either Pragmatism or Behaviorism as the last word
of science and philosophy. The desire of the philosopher to "re-
construct" his whole system in order to establish close contacts with,
and claims upon, the plain man is at times pathetic. But if philos-
ophy is to be of use and service it must be vital and significant to
the plain man—that is, the plain man who stops to think about
philosopbical issues and seeks to grasp them.
It is in this commendable spirit that philosophers and sociolo-
gists are now attacking the problem of Social Reform and endeav-
oring to vindicate it against the charge of Utopianism or repug-
nance to essential human nature. And it is in the same spirit that
efrorts are being made to prove that reforms deemed by many "rad-
ical" and revolutionary are, in point of fact, entirely consonant with
average human nature and the practical reason.
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We shall briefly discuss here two hooks that arc symptomatic
of the tendency just alluded to and interesting on other account- as
well. One is Professor John Dewey's I In man Nature and Conduit,
and the other Professor Arthur J. Todd's Theories of Social
Progress.
Professor Dewey is a philosopher and one of the most dis-
tinguished living exponents of Pragmatism. lie is known as an
advanced liberal. Professor Todd is a sociologist and a social worker
with
,
a decided leaning, philosophically speaking, toward Pergsonian
and post-Bergsonian anti-intellectualism.
Let us see how much aid and encouragement each of these
thinkers affords the advanced progressive schools of reform, on
the one hand, and the deeply-perplexed plain man on the other
—
the man who is naturally conservative, who knows that the present
social order is full of defects yet hesitates to condemn it and em-
brace a nebulous and revolutionary paper alternative for it.
Professor Dewey has no faith in social nostrums or panaceas.
He is practical in his idealism, for like a true Pragmatist he has little
use for an ideal that is divorced from reality and that seems to offer
one a Sunday consolation, sentimental and sterile in character, for
the troubles and disappointments of the rest of the week. For Pro-
fessor Dewey there are no "ideals" to be realized, no one knows how,
in the dim and distant future, but problems of the present to be dis-
cussed and solved in the present, so far as possible. Tie is an op-
portunist in the true and right sense of the term—one who believes
in making the best use of immediate opportunities in the light of
reason. Pie does not believe that any institution can be successfully
defended against attacks by asserting that it is rooted in human
nature, or that a proposal involving radical changes in institutions
is disposed of by affirming that it conflicts with human nature. It is
natural for men to act, says Professor Dewey, but it is not natural
for them to act in a given, fixed way. War. for example, is not
necessarilv inevitable because men are restless, combative and covet-
ous. They have fought and still fight for certain causes that seem
to many of us irrational or that, if rational, can now best be served
by conference, conciliation ami arbitration. But it does not follow
that men must continue to fight instead of settling disputes by sub-
mitting them to impartial tribunals. Men no longer tight duels, but
they are as combative and suspicious as ever. They tight in a differ-
ent way—that is all. There are substitutes for war. and their use
does not spell violence to human nature.
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human nature. A thing seemingly impossible may be made po
ble by creating new habits of thought, by changing ideas, by re-
adjusting superficial relations. Slavery was at one time considered
natural and ineradicable. Slavery has been abolished, but servility,
docility, dependence have not been abolished. Those who defended
slavery on biological and psychological grounds gave that term too
narrow a definition. They overlooked the elasticity of human na-
ture, the possibility of domination and government of men in wa;
less gross and coarse than slavery.
Our arguments, then, pro or con a reform in any direction
should be addressed, as common sense always has addressed them,
to two things—Reason and Conscience. Every human problem is
at bottom a scientific problem. We note a maladjustment, a source
of friction and waste and pain, a situation that disturbs and offends
many of us. Several remedies are proposed, some of them mod-
erate and some radical. How is a choice to be made? In the case
of an individual patient the advice of the best physician, or a group
of eminent physicians, is usually followed. Where the patient is
the body social and political, "the doctors disagree," and there is
no way of determining which of the groups offering diverse rem-
edies is the wisest and most authoritative. What, then, do we do?
Why, we continue the discussion, we seek to convert one another,
we write books and articles, we construct planks for party platforms
and consult the voters. We gradually attract adherents to our re-
spective programmes. Finally, some school or party, or some com-
bination of school and parties, carries the day and secures the
opportunity of applying its remedy. This remedy meantime has been
modified by criticism and perhaps by limited experiments. Reason,
conscience, fear, sympathy and other factors have contributed to the
result. The rejected alternatives proved to be repugnant to habits
of thought, to certain feelings and ideas, to "the spirit of the age."
The formula "contrary to human nature" would not cover the case.
Hence, the men and women who desiderate an important re-
form, while justified in ignoring sweeping and empty assertions of
opponents who claim an intimate knowledge of human nature, are
by no means justified in assuming that there are few difficulties in
the way of radical social alteration. On this latter point Professor
Dewey is clear, emphatic and wise. To quote:
"The force of lag in human life is enormous . . .
''Political and legal institutions may be altered, even abolished;
but the bulk of popular thought which has been shaped to their pat-
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tern persists. This is why glowing predictions of the immediate
coming of a social millennium terminate so uniformly in disappoint-
ment.
. . . Habits of thought outlive modifications in habits of
overt action. The former are vital; the latter, without the sustain-
ing life of the former, are muscular tricks. Consequently, as a rule,
the moral effects of even great revolutions, after a few years of
outwardly conspicuous alterations, do not show themselves till after
the lapse of time. A new generation must come upon the scene
whose habits of mind have been formed under the new conditions.
The Lenins, the Trotzkys, the Bela Kuns, the Haywoods and
other worshippers of Force in reform ; the intolerant fanatics who
believe themselves to be infallible and entitled to impose their ideas
upon "ignorant, backward majorities" and "perverse, doctrinaire
minorities" alike might ponder Professor Dewey's words with
profit. Bolshevik methods are condemned by the entire human rec-
ord—including the record of all great upheavals and revolutions.
Bolshevism reckoned without the mental habits and the material
conditions which militate against its success—even a partial and
slight success. The same remark may be made respecting that
strange Italian essay in revolutionary communities, the famous
"lock-in" of the metallurgical workers. Though the government
remained passive, the adventure failed dismally—the workmen were
not prepared to take over any industry, operate it efficiently, sell the
product and pay themselves living wages.
Now, these two illustrations from current experience re-enforce
Professor Dewey's argument. Communism may or may not be
repugnant to that uncertain quantity of uncertain quality, human
nature, but it incontestably proved to be repugnant to the mental
habits and the complex of conditions of contemporary Russian and
Italian life. For scientific as well as for practical purposes, this
conclusion is all sufficient.
Let us now turn to Professor Todd's work and inquire into
the bearing of its review of theories of social progress on the rad-
ical reform movements of the day.
Human nature, Professor Todd holds, is "infinitely diverse and
infinitely malleable, infinitely sensitive to change." We are a bundle
of potential selves. The real human self is social; it is built up of
social experiences ; social life furnishes not only the mold but the
very materials that are poured into the self for the casting of a
social self. We are all part and parcel of one another. We can
modify our dominant self by efforts of the will, and social educa-
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tion, including discipline and fear or dislike of censure, may and
do give us the will to modify ourselves. But what is the aim, what
the intended effect, of social education? The answer is, to civilize
and socialize the individual. More definitely still "social education
aims to create social solidarity hy means of a social type marked by
service rather than exploitation." Harmony, peace and co-operation
are, and have for centuries heen deemed possible and desirable.
When we speak of progress we mean advance toward harmony,
peace and co-operation. We are dissatisfied with present conditions,
and we are certain that this discontent is "divine"—or rather
rational and creditahle. We seek improvements and feel that they
are within our reach, provided a sufficient number of a given soci-
ety desiderate and long for them.
We say that we have a social ideal, but what we mean is that
we have a difficulty, or a set of difficulties—a problem to solve, in
short. The first question is, Is the problem soluble or insoluble?
If insoluble, the discussion ends. If soluble, then the next question
is, How ?
If we believe in social progress; if we believe, not that some
force not in or of ourselves makes for progress, but that we our-
selves, because of our intelligence, our adaptability, our power of
self-control and of control over the environment, are able to remove
the difficulties we are troubled by in industry, politics, social rela-
tions, etc., and establish a far more satisfactory state of things in
those realms ; if we believe that the individual and the body social
can reconcile their differences and live in greater harmony, each
serving the other and each helping the other in freedom and peace
to make life better worth living, then we are philosophical optimists
and practical meliorists, and it is both our duty and privilege to work
for progress.
If there be any value in a general statement of the end of
human progress, which is doubtful. Professor Todd offers the fol-
lowing formula : "Reconciling freedom of individual will with
evolution of society, the identification of man individualized and
man socialized."
Is there any evidence that man and society have been moving
toward this goal ? Certainly, answers Professor Todd. The march
has not been steady, and at times it seems to have been arrested
altogether, or even to have taken a backward direction. But on the
whole, if we take definite standards and measures of value and
apply them to human history, we cannot fail to conclude that man
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and society have not unsuccessfully adjusted many serious differ-
ences and removed many obstacles in the way of individual expan-
sion and social efficiency and co-operation.
Human nature has made past progress possible and has condi-
tioned it and even imposed it. The same human nature will impose,
insure and condition further progress. Crime, poverty, cruelty,
injustice, oppression are severally symptoms of discord and mal-
adjustment. Man is not yet adapted to the social state; the state
has not learned to respect and to make the best use of the individual
and his faculties. Harmony will not be achieved in a century, per-
haps not in a millennium. But it will be achieved gradually, if at all,
and many of us—a constantly increasing number, happily—are
making "the goal of human progress" our individual goal. That is,
many of us are earnestly grappling with the questions which divide
modern civilized society, cause waste and trouble, breed animosity
and hatred and lead to international and internecine warfare in vari-
ous forms. We have as yet little agreement respecting the remedies
to be applied, the preventives to be adopted, but deep study, think-
ing and discussion will sooner or later evolve a substantial consensus
of opinion in the premises.
Why are we interested in the questions that are connected with
the "goal of human progress?" Do we expect personal benefits
from the efforts we are making? Are we selfish or unselfish in
making those efforts?
The answers to these queries are important, for they are bound
to throw light on the general and abstract question of human prog-
ress. But too often the answers given are superficial, dogmatic,
narrow. Men are not governed by simple or single motives. They
do not know where self-interest ends and altruism begins. They
are not certain altruism is free from a touch of self-interest. All
that we can know and need to know is that all sorts and conditions
of men are co-operating, for various reasons, or without any definite
conscious reason, in the search for the solution of the complex of
social problems we identify with human progress. Some men are
selfish, or think they are. Others are disinterested, or think they
are. Some are curious and intellectually interested in those prob-
lems, while others reveal an emotional interest in them. Some are
in love with their own ideas on the subject and persistently press
them on the community. Others maintain an open mind as to par-
ticular ideas, but are willing and anxious that the search and dis-
cussion shall continue till solutions are found.
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We arc what we arc. We have made progress because of our
qualities, and in spite of some of our qualities. Wc shall continue
to make progress, and with the same qualities and propensities.
"Human nature," to repeat, does not obstruct progress, but, on the
contrary, invites and demands it, but what in a given case is in line
with progress and what not, is a question intelligence and reflection
alone can answer. It is, first and last, a scientific question, and
facts, experiments, more facts and more experiments will eventually
enable society to settle it. It will not be settled by "the superior
few," by benevolent and tyrannical majorities. The plain man will
have to be reckoned with and consulted; he will have to be—not
perhaps fully converted by elaborate arguments and demonstrations,
but certainly favorably impressed, interested and rendered tolerant
and open-minded in regard to the proposed reforms. The function
of the advanced minority is to lead, not to drive. The plain man
has boycotted reform as he has boycotted philosophy. Neither
seemed meant for him. Both arc meant for him—if they are meant
for life; if they are to be of service to humanity. "Democracies,"
said James Brycc, "are what their leaders make them."' This is
true, for no society can dispense with initiative, foresight and vi-
sion, or with the leadership of those who possess these rare gifts,
and no society ever does dispense with them for any considerable
period. But the leaders in modern society, if they aspire to endur-
ing influence, must beware of intellectual arrogance or tactless
claims to superiority and privilege. They can only mold and make
society by winning its sympathy, affection and confidence. They
can make it. especially, by enlisting the younger elements and giving
them new ideas and new mental habits. Philosophers and reformers
are first of all educators and should act as competent educators do.
Coercion, fanaticism, supercilious airs, contempt for the students
have never made an educator or school successful. Education, not
force, is the means to social progress, as it is the means to the popu-
larization and dissemination of sound philosophical ideas.
